Missouri Supreme Court Rules: Despite Change in Statute, Sleeping It off behind the Wheel Is Still Not an Option by Miller, Amanda Allen
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 69 
Issue 3 Summer 2004 Article 8 
Summer 2004 
Missouri Supreme Court Rules: Despite Change in Statute, 
Sleeping It off behind the Wheel Is Still Not an Option 
Amanda Allen Miller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Amanda Allen Miller, Missouri Supreme Court Rules: Despite Change in Statute, Sleeping It off behind the 
Wheel Is Still Not an Option, 69 MO. L. REV. (2004) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss3/8 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Missouri Supreme Court Rules: Despite
Change in Statute, Sleeping it off Behind the
Wheel Is Still not an Option
Cox v, Director of Revenue'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2002, alcohol related highway accidents killed 17,419 people in the
2United States. These amounted to 41 percent of all highway deaths in that
year.3 In addition to causing physical and property damage, driving while
intoxicated can result in serious legal consequences for drunk drivers. Get-
ting behind the wheel after having too much to drink can result in a criminal
conviction punishable by fines, community service, probation, and incarcera-
tion.4 A drunk driver may also have his driver's license suspended or re-
voked. 5
When one thinks of drunk driving, one usually imagines a person ca-
reening down the road, putting the lives of other motorists in danger. How-
ever, an intoxicated person may be subject to the same drunk driving sanc-
tions simply by sitting, sleeping, or passing out in the driver's seat after turn-
ing on the motor. In Cox v. Director of Revenue, the Missouri Supreme Court
upheld a driver's license revocation on just those facts, holding that when a
driver is in a vehicle and the motor is running, there is probable cause to be-
lieve that he is "operating" the vehicle even if he is asleep or unconscious.
6
However, the court further held that the act of turning off the motor is not
"operating."
7
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
At about 10:20 p.m. on August 15, 1998, Eldon Missouri police officer
James A. Upton responded to a report that a Cadillac was parked in a gas
station parking lot at the intersection of Business 54 and Highway 87 with its
1. 98 S.W.3d 548 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
2. Press Release, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, USDOT




4. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.010 (2000).
5. Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.505 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
6. Cox, 98 S.W.3d at 550.
7. Id. at 551.
1
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engine running and its lights on. Approaching the green Cadillac, Officer
Upton saw Steven Cox asleep or unconscious in the driver's seat.9 When the
officer knocked on the window, Cox awoke, disoriented and confused.' 0
When Cox rolled the window down, Officer Upton noticed that there was a
glass containing a dark brown liquid tucked between Cox's legs, and Cox
smelled strongly of alcohol.' When Officer Upton asked Cox if he was all
right, Cox informed the officer that he was just sitting there.' 2 The officer
noticed that Cox's eyes were watery and bloodshot.13
Officer Upton asked Cox to shut off the motor and get out of the car,
and Cox complied.' 4 Cox was put through a series of field sobriety tests at
Officer Upton's direction.' 5 Cox was unable to perform the walk-and-turn
test 16 or the one-leg stand, 17 and his performance on the horizontal gaze nys-
tagmus test demonstrated that he was intoxicated.' 8 Officer Upton arrested
Cox for driving while intoxicated and for possession of an open container of
alcohol. 19 In response to Officer Upton's inquiries, Cox indicated that he had,
indeed, been operating the vehicle. He also informed the officer that he had
started drinking whiskey and iced tea in his vehicle on Lake Y10 at approxi-
mately 6:00 p.m.21 Cox told the officer that, in the three hours prior to his
arrest, he had been boat riding and sleeping, and that he had "pulled off the
8. Cox v. Dir. of Revenue, No. WD 59189, 2002 WL 1070548, at *1 (Mo. Ct.








16. In the walk-and-turn test, a suspect is asked to walk a certain number of
steps, heel-to-toe, then turn and walk back in the same manner. State v. Lawson, 84
S.W.3d 170, 172 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
17. In the one-leg stand test, a suspect is asked to stand on one foot and raise the
other foot while the officer counts to thirty. A suspect will fail this test if he touches
the raised foot to the ground three times or more. State v. Wheeler, 764 S.W.2d 523,
524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
18. Cox, 2002 WL 1070548, at * 1. In the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, "an
individual's eye movements are tested as a means of determining whether they are
under the influence of alcohol." State v. Hill, 865 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Mo. Ct. App.
1993), overruled by State v. Carson, 941 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1997) (en banc). The
suspect is instructed to follow the movements of an object with his eyes as the officer
moves the object horizontally, back and forth. Id. Jerking of the eyes, especially at
the periphery of vision or at certain angles, indicates to the testing officer that the
suspect is intoxicated. Id.
19. Cox, 2002 WL 1070548, at *1.
20. Cox v. Dir. of Revenue, 98 S.W.3d. 548, 549 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
21. Cox, 2002 WL 1070548, at *2.
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road" to sleep at approximately 9:00 p.m. 22 A breath analysis test showed
that Cox's blood alcohol content was. 18 percent.
23
Subsequently, Cox received notice that his driving privileges were sus-
pended pursuant to Missouri Revised Statute Section 302.505.24 He re-
quested an administrative hearing with the Department of Revenue. 25 Cox's
administrative hearing resulted in the Department of Revenue sustaining the
suspension of his driving privileges. 26 Next, Cox petitioned for de novo re-
view in the Circuit Court of Miller County.27 The parties agreed to forgo the
evidentiary hearing and submitted the case on the Department of Revenue's
records, including Officer Upton's report. 28 The Circuit Court noted, how-
ever, that Cox disputed the admissibility of Officer Upton's report on the
grounds that Officer Upton lacked probable cause to arrest him. 29 Cox ar-
gued that there was no probable cause because Upton did not observe Cox
"driving" or "operating" the car. 30 Ultimately, the trial court found that the
Director of Revenue did not meet the required burden of proof and ordered
Cox's driver's license reinstated.3 '
The Director of Revenue appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Western District.32 Reversing the trial court's decision, the Court of Appeals
held that while the circumstantial evidence that Cox was driving his vehicle
was insufficient, Officer Upton had probable cause to arrest Cox for operating
his vehicle based on the fact that the car was running and Cox was behind the
wheel.33 The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed, holding that (1) causing a
vehicle's motor to run is "operating" the vehicle; and (2) the act of turning off
the engine, by itself, is not "operating."
34
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Revised Missouri Statute Section 302.505 outlines administrative pro-
cedures for suspending or revoking a driver's license when a person is con-
victed of driving a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol content.
35
22. Id.
23. Id. at * 1. At that time, a blood alcohol concentration of .10 percent or more
was punishable. Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.520 (Supp. 1997) (amended 2001).






30. Cox v. Dir. of Revenue, 98 S.W.3d 548, 549 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
31. Cox, 2002 WL 1070548, at *2.
32. Id. at * 1.
33. Id. at *11.
34. Cox, 98 S.W.3d at 551.
35. Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.505 (2000).
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However, that statute does not provide a definition of the word "driving," so
Missouri courts have applied the definition of "driving" set forth in Section
577.001,36 which provides definitions for criminal public safety offenses,
including driving while intoxicated." Before 1996, Section 577.001 defined
"driving" as "physically driving or operating or being in actual physical con-
trol of a motor vehicle." 38 The current definition, adopted in 1996, omitted
the language referring to "actual physical control.",39 Determining the scope
of this current definition and what behaviors fall within it has continually
challenged Missouri courts.
Section 302.505 indicates that an individual's driver's license will be
suspended or revoked by the Department of Revenue "upon its determination
that the person was arrested upon probable cause to believe such person was
driving a motor vehicle" while he or she had a prohibited alcohol concentra-
tion in his or her blood.4 Probable cause exists when "an officer possesses
facts which would justify a person of reasonable caution to believe that an
offense has been or is being committed and that the individual to be arrested
committed it."41 An officer makes this determination "'in relation to the cir-
cumstances as they would have appeared to a prudent, cautious, and trained
police officer.'42 The police officer need not actually see a person driving
drunk in order to find probable cause to arrest; rather, the officer may rely on
circumstantial evidence. 43 If circumstantial evidence shows that a defendant
actually drove his or her vehicle while intoxicated, it is unnecessary to dem-
onstrate that he or she was "operating" the vehicle. However, proof that a
defendant was "operating" a running vehicle by simply sitting behind the
wheel becomes important when there is little or no evidence that the defen-
dant actually drove.
36. Mo. REV. STAT. § 577.001 (2000).
37. Weiland v. Dir. of Revenue, 32 S.W.3d 628, 630-31 (Mo. App. Ct. 2000),
overruled in part by Verdoom v. Dir. of Revenue, 119 S.W.3d 543 (Mo. 2003) (en
banc).
38. Mo. REV. STAT. § 577.001 (1994) (amended 1996).
39. Act of July 2, 1996, No. 722, § A, 1996 Mo. Laws 574, 593 (codified as
amended at Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.001 (2000)).
40. Mo. REv. STAT. § 302.505.1.
41. Schulte v. Dir. of Revenue, 55 S.W.3d 876, 879 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
42. Chinnery v. Dir. of Revenue, 885 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (quot-
ing Stoltz v. Dir. of Revenue, 816 S.W.2d 711, 714 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991), abrogated
by Cox v. Dir. of Revenue, 98 S.W.3d 548 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)).
43. Kramer v. Dir. of Revenue, 924 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); see
also Baptist v. Lohman, 971 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). For example, an
officer had probable cause to arrest a suspect for driving while intoxicated when the
suspect was found passed out in the driver's seat with the keys in the ignition, and
there was testimony that the car had only been in the parking lot for a few minutes.
Delzell v. Lohman, 983 S.W.2d 633, 634-35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
[Vol. 69
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There is no shortage of Missouri cases involving an intoxicated person
asleep or unconscious behind the wheel of a vehicle. Prior to the 1996
amendment to the drunk driving penal statute, most of these cases classified
such individuals as having operated the vehicle based on the fact that their
actions met the definition of "actual physical control."" "Actual physical
control" is defined as "existing or present bodily restraint, directing influence,
domination or regulation of a vehicle . . . even where the vehicle is mo-
tionless as long as the person is keeping the vehicle in restraint or is in a posi-
tion to regulate its movements. ' 4s The fact that a driver is asleep or uncon-
scious behind the steering wheel will not defeat a finding of actual physical
control.46 In State v. O'Toole,47 an intoxicated driver was found behind the
wheel of a car that was running, had its headlights on, and was partially
blocking westbound U.S. Highway 40.48 The Missouri Supreme Court re-
viewed the definition of "actual physical control" and held that because the
defendant "was in a position to regulate [his] vehicle's movements," he was
"operating" his vehicle.49
Baptist v. Lohman50 was the first decision to interpret the driver's li-
cense revocation statute after the 1996 amendments. In that case, a conven-
ience store employee noticed Billy Joe Baptist's pickup truck parked in the
store's parking lot just before midnight on February 27, 1997.51 Although the
employee did not see the truck arrive, she did notice Baptist sitting behind the
wheel with his eyes closed.52 After thirty to forty-five minutes, the employee
44. See State v. O'Toole, 673 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Mo. 1984) (en banc), superseded
by statute as stated in Cox, 98 S.W.3d 548; Krienke v. Lohman, 963 S.W.2d 11, 12
(Mo. Ct. App. 1998), abrogated by Cox, 98 S.W.3d 548; State v. Nickerson, 763
S.W.2d 716, 717 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989), abrogated by Cox, 98 S.W.3d 548; State v.
Hoeber, 737 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987), abrogated by Cox, 98 S.W.3d
548; Taylor v. McNeill, 714 S.W.2d 947, 948 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (police found
defendant passed out in the passenger seat; court held defendant had physical control),
abrogated by Cox, 98 S.W.3d 548; City of Kansas City v. Troutner, 544 S.W.2d 295,
300 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (defendant was convicted under Kansas City Municipal
Ordinance § 34.116, the functional equivalent of § 577.010, which uses the defini-
tions in § 577.001).
45. Taylor, 714 S.W.2d at 948.
46. Id. In proving actual physical control, it is not necessary to show that the
defendant intended to drive the vehicle. State v. Dey, 798 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1990), abrogated by Cox, 98 S.W.3d 548.
47. 673 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. 1984) (en banc), superseded by statute as stated in Cox,
98 S.W.3d 548.
48. Id. at 26.
49. Id. at 27; see also State v. Stimmel, 800 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990); Dey, 798 S.W.2d at 212.
50. 971 S.W.2d 366 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
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called the police. 53 An officer arrived at about 1:30 a.m. and observed Baptist
slumped behind the wheel of the idling truck.54 The officer had some diffi-
culty waking Baptist.55 Baptist failed subsequent field sobriety tests and,
after being taken to the police station, refused to submit to a breath alcohol
56test. The court held that, in spite of Baptist's claims, the circumstantial
evidence forming the basis of his arrest was sufficient, and the revocation of
his license was upheld despite the change in the statute. 57 The court did not
specifically address how or whether the removal of "actual physical control"
from the statute affected the definition of "operate."
58
In contrast, State v. Cross5 9 is a post-1996 amendment case that dis-
cusses the effect of the amendment in great detail. In Cross, police officers
found a driver slumped across the seat of his car with the headlights on and
the motor running. When the police officer who discovered him asked the
defendant how much alcohol he had consumed, the defendant replied, "Not
enough.''6 After being arrested and taken to the police station, the defendant
submitted to a breathalyzer test which showed his blood alcohol content to be
.182 percent. 62 On appeal from his subsequent conviction, the defendant
argued that the court lacked sufficient evidence to establish that he was oper-
ating a motor vehicle.63 The appellate court acknowledged that previous
cases with similar fact patterns have focused on the "actual physical control"
portion of Section 577.001.64 However, the court explained that it was not
necessary to determine whether a defendant was operating or driving the ve-
hicle if actual physical control was found because that term encompassed the
other two acts.65 The court held that sleeping behind the wheel of a running
car falls within the definition of "operate," which had been construed broadly





57. Id. at 368. Baptist argued that the changes in the statute required that an
intoxicated person actually be seen driving a vehicle. Id. He asserted that circum-
stantial evidence was no longer enough. Id.
58. Id.
59. 34 S.W.3d 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000), overruled by Cox v. Dir. of Revenue,
98 S.W.3d 548 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
60. Id. at 177.
61. Id. at 178.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 181.
65. Id. at 182-83.
66. Id. at 178-81. The Cross court failed to define "operate," but determined that
the defendant's behavior undoubtedly constituted operation. Id. at 180. In 1949, the
Missouri Supreme Court, defining the term in Section 304.010, said
[Vol. 69
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acts of being in a car with the engine running and then turning off the car's
engine and headlights constituted operation of his car." 67 The defendant's
conviction was upheld.68
The term "operate" in driving-while-intoxicated statutes has been chal-
lenged as unconstitutionally vague. The Missouri Supreme Court considered
and rejected such a challenge in State v. Johnson.69 That court held that the
word "operate" had a commonly understood meaning that was readily under-
stood by jurors, and declared that it was unnecessary for a statute to define
such a common word.70 A more recent case challenging the use of "operate"
in the current version of Section 577.001, State v. Wiles, 71 came to the same
conclusion. In that case, the court held that "operate" had "a plain and ordi-
nary meaning cognizable by a person of ordinary intelligence.,
72
Other states in the Eighth Circuit seem to agree with Missouri that an in-
toxicated slumber behind the wheel of an idling car is sanctionable behavior.
Minnesota case law states that "physical control is meant to cover situations
where an inebriated person is found in a parked vehicle that, without too
much difficulty, might again be started and become a source of danger." 73 In
North Dakota, a sleeping driver can be found to be in "actual physical con-
trol" when the keys are in the car's ignition but the motor is not running,
74
"[A]II acts... fairly incidental to the ordinary course of [an automobile's]
operation, including not only the act of stopping en route for purposes rea-
sonably associated with the transit but also all acts which, in point of time
and circumstance, are reasonably connected with entering the vehicle at
the point of departure and alighting therefrom at destination."
Teters v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 300 S.W.2d 511, 516 (Mo. 1957) (quoting
Kames v. Ace Cab Co., 287 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956)). The Cross court
did not adopt this definition, but merely used it as an example of the court's broad
treatment of "operate." Cross, 34 S.W.3d at 178-79.
67. Cross, 34 S.W.3d at 181; see also Hoyt v. Dir. of Revenue, 37 S.W.3d 356,
360 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (supports Cross's holding that turning off the engine consti-
tutes operation), overruled by Cox v. Dir. of Revenue, 98 S.W.3d 548 (Mo. 2003) (en
banc).
68. Cross, 34 S.W.3d at 185.
69. 55 S.W.2d 967 (Mo. 1932).
70. Id at 968.
71. 26 S.W.3d 436 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
72. Id at 443.
73. Flamang v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 516 N.W.2d 577, 581 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994) (citing State v. Starfield, 481 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Minn. 1992)). Based on that
standard, intoxicated individuals have been convicted in Minnesota for sitting in the
driver's seat with the car keys in a pants pocket, Vivier v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety,
406 N.W.2d 587, 590 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), and for sleeping in the front seat while
the keys are in the backseat, Sens v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 399 N.W.2d 602 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987).
74. Buck v. N.D. State Highway Comm'r, 425 N.W.2d 370, 372-73 (N.D. 1988).
2004]
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and even when the keys are in a driver's coat pocket.75 Iowa's case law in-
terprets the term "operate," found in its operating-while-intoxicated statute,
76
as "'the immediate, actual physical control over a motor vehicle that is in
motion and/or has its engine running." '77 Iowa courts have specifically held
that an intoxicated person asleep behind the wheel of car with the engine run-
ning is "operating" the car.78 South Dakota and Arkansas courts have each
upheld similar convictions, holding that such behavior constitutes "physical
control" of the vehicle.
79
In contrast, the New Hampshire Supreme Court sided with a sleeping
drunk found behind the wheel of his car with the motor running, holding that
[w]hen the occupant is totally passive, has not in any way at-
tempted to actively control the vehicle, and there is no reason to
believe that the inebriated person is imminently going to control
the vehicle in his or her condition, we do not believe that the legis-
lature intended for criminal sanctions to apply.
80
In another New Hampshire case that involved a drunk who was found sitting
behind the wheel of his car with the motor and lights off, the opposite result
was reached because the intoxicated driver admitted that he was waiting for a
telephone call from his wife so that he could pick her up.
81
Arizona has chosen to reject rigid definitions of "actual physical con-
trol," choosing instead to consider several factors in each case, including:
whether the vehicle was running or the ignition was on; where the
key was located; where and in what position the driver was found
in the vehicle; whether the person was awake or asleep; if the vehi-
cle's headlights were on; where the vehicle was stopped (in the
road or legally parked); whether the driver had voluntarily pulled
off the road; time of day and weather conditions; if the heater or air
75. City of Fargo v. Theusch, 462 N.W.2d 162 (N.D. 1990).
76. IOWA CODE § 321J.2 (Supp. 2003).
77. State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Iowa 1998) (quoting State v. Bo-
leyn, 547 N.W.2d 202, 205 (Iowa 1996)).
78. State v. Murray, 539 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1995) (per curiam).
79. Blakemore v. State, 758 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988); Kirby v.
State Dept. of Pub. Safety, 262 N.W.2d 49, 52 (S.D. 1978).
80. State v. Willard, 660 A.2d 1086, 1088 (N.H. 1995). This case is an interest-
ing contrast to Missouri law because the New Hampshire legislature had changed the
law to prohibit the "driving" of a motor vehicle while under the influence. Act of Jan.
1, 1982, No. 146, 1981 N.H. Laws 142, 268-69 (codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
265.82 (1993)). The legislature's definition of "drive" includes "actual physical con-
trol." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 259:24 (1993).
81. State v. Holloran, 669 A.2d 800, 801-02 (N.H. 1995) (per curiam).
[Vol. 69
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conditioner was on; whether the windows were up or down; and




In Cox v. Director of Revenue,83 the Missouri Supreme Court held that a
driver who is asleep or unconscious behind the wheel of a running vehicle is
"operating" that vehicle within the meaning of Section 302.505 of the Mis-
souri Revised Statutes.84 The court also held that the act of turning off a ve-
hicle is not, by itself, "operating" a vehicle within the meaning of the stat-
ute. 5 The court began by examining the terms in Section 302.505,86 as they
are defined in Section 577.001.87 Pre-1996, the term "driving" was defined
as "'physically driving or operating or being in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle."' 88 In 1996, the Missouri General Assembly removed the
"actual physical control" language from the statute. 89 The court noted that
when the legislature changes the language of a statute, that change is pre-
sumed to effect a change in the existing law, and that this particular change
was intended to narrow the scope of behaviors that fall under the definition of
"driving." 9 The intent of the legislature, the court observed, was to under-
mine its previous holding that "actual physical control" meant that "'even
though the machine merely stands motionless .... a person keeps the vehicle
in restraint or [is] in a position to regulate its movements."' 91 In addition, the
fact that the legislature again used the terms "driving" and "operating" indi-
cated that it intended both words have separate meanings, although neither
word is defined in Section 577.001.92 Therefore, the intent of the legislature
must be discerned by examining the plain and ordinary meaning of the
words.93 The court examined the dictionary definition of each word and
found that, according to Webster's Third New International Dictionary,
82. State v. Love, 897 P.2d 626, 628 (Ariz. 1995). Arizona is a Ninth Circuit
state.
83. 98 S.W.3d 548 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
84. Id. at 550.
85. Id. at 551.
86. Id. at 550.
87. Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.001 (2000).
88. Cox, 98 S.W.3d at 550 (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.001.1 (1994)).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. O'Toole, 673 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Mo.
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"drive" means "to guide a vehicle along or through," and "operate" means "to
cause to function usually by direct personal effort."
94
The court held that because Mr. Cox was not guiding his vehicle along
or through anything, he was not driving the car.95 However, the court did
find that Mr. Cox was operating his vehicle because he had caused its engine
to function, and also found that the officer had probable cause to believe that
a person behind the wheel of an idling vehicle was operating that vehicle
even if that person was not awake or conscious at the time.96 Because lack of
probable cause was the only issue Mr. Cox raised in his appeal, the court held
that the suspension of Mr. Cox's license was appropriate.
97
Finally, the court overruled previous cases that held that the act of turn-
ing off the engine was "operating" the vehicle. 98 Because turning off the
vehicle's engine causes the vehicle not to function, the court held that this act
does not fall under the "operating" definition.99 In addition, the court ex-
plained that cases decided before the 1996 amendment could not be relied on
to properly define "operating," because "driving" and "operating" were not
defined separately before 1996.'00
B. Dissenting Opinions
Justice White dissented from the majority decision.' 0 He agreed with
the majority's finding that the Missouri General Assembly intended to narrow
the scope of the statute when they deleted the phrase "actual physical control"
from the definition of "driving."' 1 2 However, he argued that the majority
"appears to ignore its own observation.' 103 In Justice White's view, Mr.
Cox's behavior fit exactly the court's definition of "actual physical control":
keeping in restraint a motionless vehicle, while being "in a position to regu-
late its movements." 1° 4 Justice White observed that the definition of "actual
physical control" comes from a case with facts that are very similar to those
in the instant case.1° 5 In that case, Kansas City v. Troutner, ° 6 a man was
94. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 692, 1581
(1993)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 550-51.




101. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
102. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 551-52 (White, J., dissenting). See supra note 45 and accompanying
text.
105. Cox, 98 S.W.3d at 552 (White, J., dissenting).
106. 544 S.W.2d 295 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
[Vol. 69
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found asleep behind the wheel of a camper in a parking lot with the camper's
engine running. 0 7 Justice White argued that the legislature had changed the
statutory language with the intent of allowing intoxicated persons to sit or
sleep behind the wheel of a motionless vehicle without criminal or adminis-
trative punishment. 10 8 He criticized the majority's definition of the word
"operate" as frustrating the intent of the legislature. 0 9 Justice White reiter-
ated that a legislative change to a statute is presumed to have some effect, but
that the majority's definition of "operate," which includes the same situations
that "actual physical control" used to include, prevents the legislature's statu-
tory amendment from having any effect."1
0
Justice Wolff, in a separate dissent, agreed with Justice White. 11 He
added that, in order to avoid the hazards of drunk driving, it should be legal
for that person to sleep behind the wheel of a motionless car, where the risks
are to the drunk only, and not to innocent parties.' "
2
V. COMMENT
When a statute is amended by the legislature, that amendment is in-
tended to make some change in the existing law." 3 Judge Ellis, dissenting in
State v. Cross," 14 pointed out that "[t]o amend a statute and accomplish noth-
ing from the amendment would be a meaningless act.'" 1 5 He contends that
the way Missouri courts have chosen to interpret the amendment to Section
577.001 has stripped the amendment of any meaning."1
6
The vast majority of "actual physical control" cases occur when an in-
toxicated person is sleeping behind the wheel of a running car.117 Judge Ellis
argued that "Missouri courts have consistently upheld driving while intoxi-
cated ... convictions and license revocations and suspensions where the de-
fendant or licensee is sitting in a motionless vehicle with the engine running
solely under the theory that the person was in 'actual physical control' of the
vehicle."'"18 Courts have repeatedly used the same theory to uphold convic-
tions of drivers found asleep or unconscious behind the wheel while the mo-
tor is running."19 It now appears that, after the 1996 amendment, the courts
107. Cox, 98 S.W.3d at 552 (White, J., dissenting).
108. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
110. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
11. Id. (Wolff, J., dissenting).
112. Id. (Wolff, J., dissenting).
113. Wollard v. City of Kansas City, 831 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Mo. 1992) (en banc).
114. 34 S.W.3d 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000), overruled by Cox, 98 S.W.3d 548.
115. Id. at 185 (Ellis, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 186 (Ellis, J., dissenting).
117. See supra note 44.
118. Cross, 34 S.W.3d at 186 (emphasis added) (Ellis, J., dissenting).
119. Id. (Ellis, J., dissenting).
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intend the term "operate" to encompass almost all situations that previously
fell solely under the term "actual physical control."
Dissenting again in Cox at the appellate level, Judge Ellis pointed out
that "[t]he function of the judiciary is to interpret statutory language to give
effect to the intent of the Legislature and not to write or re-write statutes."1 20
The legislature likely looked toward the kinds of cases they wished to de-
criminalize and then eliminated that portion of the statute under which most
of those cases fell. The majority in Cross claimed that it was giving effect to
the intent of the legislature, but at the same time admits that "actual physical
control" traditionally and most frequently involves this particular situation.1
21
The legislature most likely intended to allow intoxicated persons to sleep in a
warm, heated car rather than attempt to drive home. As Justice White ex-
claimed in his Cox dissent, the majority ignored its own research. 122 It would
certainly seem that the judiciary and the legislature are at odds with one an-
other: the legislature undoubtedly attempted to narrow the definition of
"driving" and therefore the range of activities that can be sanctioned, while
the judiciary is fighting to keep that definition as encompassing as possible.
This ideological conflict was illustrated in State v. Cross. The majority in
that case asserted, "[a] drunken individual in the driver's seat of a motor ve-
hicle with the engine running poses a danger to the driving public." 123 The
dissent, speaking on behalf of the legislature, retorted, "[t]he revision serves
the legitimate purpose of encouraging individuals who are concerned that
they might be impaired to get off the roadway and stop, thereby enhancing
the safety of the driving public."'' 24
The Missouri Supreme Court in Cox explained that it "ascertains the
legislature's intent by considering the plain and ordinary meaning of the
words in the statute;" because the definition of "operate" cannot be found
within the statute, it is found in the dictionary.125 That court found that to run
a vehicle's motor is "'to cause to function,"' and it is difficult to disagree
with that finding. 126 Because the court had to use this dictionary definition of
"operate," it had to concede that turning off the motor is not "operating."
This concession does little to further the intent of the legislature, for it is dif-
ficult to imagine a situation in which the only behavior on the part of the
driver is turning off the car. Turning off the motor has been used in the past
120. Cox v. Dir. of Revenue, No. WD 59189, 2002 WL 1070548, at *15 (Mo. Ct.
App. May 31, 2002) (Ellis, J., dissenting), transferred, 98 S.W.3d 548 (Mo. 2003) (en
banc).
121. Cross, 34 S.W.3d at 181.
122. Cox v. Dir. of Revenue, 98 S.W.3d 548, 552 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (White, J.,
dissenting).
123. Cross, 34 S.W.3d at 182.
124. Id. at 187 (Ellis, J., dissenting).
125. Cox, 98 S.W.3d at 550.
126. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1581
(1993)); see supra text accompanying note 94.
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as direct evidence of operation of the vehicle, 27 but such evidence is now
largely unnecessary if a driver can be convicted for simply sitting or sleeping
behind the wheel when the car is running.
Cox v. Director of Revenue upheld lower court authority that the re-
moval of "actual physical control" from Section 302.505 had no effect on this
common situation. If the goal of the legislature was to encourage an intoxi-
cated driver to sleep behind the wheel rather than drive, a test similar to the
one New Hampshire uses might fit this goal. Such a test allows intoxicated
persons to use their vehicle as a shelter for safety and warmth while they
sleep, while it punishes those who intend to move the vehicle and endanger
themselves and others.' 28 Of course, police officers and courts may under-
standably have trouble determining which drivers fall into which categories.
A flexible, factors-based test like the one used in Arizona could also be help-
ful because courts would be allowed to take each individual driver's unique
situation into account when deciding whether he had "actual physical control"
of the vehicle.' 29 However, this test could leave many Missouri drivers won-
dering where the boundaries of legally acceptable behavior lie. Perhaps, if it
is still the intent of the Missouri General Assembly to allow intoxicated driv-
ers to sit or sleep behind the wheel of an idling car, Section 302.505 should
be amended again to include a definition of the term "operate" that specifi-
cally excludes such behavior.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Cox v. Director of Revenue, the court defined the term "operate" as it
applies to Section 302.505.3 o It reaffirmed that sleeping behind the wheel of
a car while the engine is running falls under that definition, and it overruled
cases that held that the act of turning off the car's motor is "operating.
'' 31
Historically, Missouri courts have described sleeping while intoxicated in a
car with the motor running as having "actual physical control" of that car.
When the General Assembly removed that portion of its definition of "driv-
ing," courts began to classify that behavior as "operating" the vehicle, a term
that was still included in the definition. In doing so, the court may have ig-
nored the intent of the legislature, who, by removing "actual physical control"
from the definition, intended to decriminalize and de-sanction that behavior.
However, by not defining the term "operate," the legislature has allowed the
judiciary to define the term using the dictionary definition. The legislature
and the judiciary clearly have differing views on the dangerousness of allow-
127. Hoyt v. Dir. of Revenue, 37 S.W.3d 356 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
128. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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ing an intoxicated driver to turn on his motor and sleep behind the wheel.
Because the Missouri Supreme Court in Cox upheld lower court decisions to
punish drivers for such behavior, it seems the legislature will have to again
amend the statute in order to obtain the effect that it seeks-allowing drunk
drivers to sleep it off behind the wheel.
AMANDA ALLEN MILLER
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